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Impression Management in Annual Report Narratives: 




Purpose – The UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) public policy is heavily criticised. PFI 
contracts are highly profitable leading to incentives for PFI private-sector companies to support 
PFI public policy. This contested nature of PFIs requires legitimation by PFI private-sector 
companies, by means of impression management, in terms of the attention to and framing of 
PFI in PFI private-sector company annual reports. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – PFI-related annual report narratives of three UK PFI 
private-sector companies, over seven years and across two periods of significant change in the 
development of the PFI public policy, are analysed using manual content analysis.  
 
Findings – Results suggest that PFI private-sector companies use impression management to 
legitimise during periods of uncertainty for PFI public policy, to alleviate concerns, to provide 
credibility for the policy and to legitimise the private sector’s own involvement in PFI. 
 
Research limitations/implications – While based on a sizeable database, the research is 
limited to the study of three PFI private-sector companies. 
 
Originality/value – Portrayal of public policy in annual report narratives has not been subject 
to prior research. The research demonstrates how managers of PFI private-sector companies 
present PFI narratives in support of public policy direction that, in turn, benefits PFI private-
sector companies. 
 
Keywords Annual report narratives, impression management, legitimacy theory, Private 
Finance Initiative 
 





Impression management originated in the social psychology literature concerning individuals 
(Goffman, 1959) and has been applied in corporate reporting, including the study of contested 
contexts such as adverse financial performance, corporate scandals, environmental disasters 
and major re-organisations (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). During such events, managers 
use corporate communication strategies to attempt to influence stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
company (Hooghiemstra, 2000). These corporate communication strategies manifest in the 
discretionary financial, social and environmental narratives in annual reports (Deegan, 2002). 
 
UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI), also called Public Private Partnerships (PPP), entails 
partnership between public bodies and private-sector companies to enable the State to procure 
infrastructure using private financing. The State pays private-sector organisations throughout 
each contract, from which private-sector organisations make a return for their shareholders. 
PFI has delivered around 700 new facilities across the UK, equating to approximately £55 
billion of private-sector investment (Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury, 2012). Despite failing to 
meet public needs (Infrastructure UK, 2011), the UK Government remains committed to PFI 
(Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 2016). Additionally, PFI continues to expand 
worldwide, particularly in Canada, the US, Italy and Portugal (Akintoye et al., 2016). We 
believe external influences (such as from private-sector companies) on Government have 
positively affected support for PFI. PFI has continued as a procurement method, despite 
extensive criticism (explored in Section 2) and despite available alternatives that could have 
provided cheaper access to capital (House of Commons, 2010; 2011a). PFI has attracted 
continued Government support even from political parties that previously opposed it. This 
contested context suggests impression management as a suitable lens for studying PFI in 
private-sector company annual reports. 
 
Research agendas for PFI seek to understand the implications of PFI, including its nature, the 
rationale for its pursuit, the regulation of its application and the role and effects of PFI public 
policy and practice, including reporting of these arrangements (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999; 
Andon, 2012). From a policy perspective, governments, private consortia and financial 
management structures and rules have contributed to the favourable development of PFI 
(English and Guthrie, 2003; Newberry and Pallot, 2003). For example, Newberry (2004, p. 12) 
conjectures that PFI public policy developed, not on its own merits, but that “the roles played 
by some private-sector parties to promote PPP-deals suggests the existence of a PPP-web 
promoting these deals”. In a US context, Baker (2003) argues that the development of PFI is 
linked to the influence of private-sector interests. Shaoul et al. (2007, p. 491) discuss the 
participation of UK private-sector accounting firms in lobbying for the expansion of PFI, 
arguing that “social networks” determined the development of PFI, reducing the role of the 
civil service and local government officers. Asenova and Beck (2010) criticise the influence of 
private financiers in PFI public policy. This strand of research questions the control and 
motivations surrounding PFI public-policy development, which has implications for 
democratic government and public accountability (Andon, 2012). The potential for private-
sector self-interested company managers to influence public-policy direction and support can 
create long-term significant change (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Thus, understanding the source, 
extent and implications of influence on PFI public policy is important. 
 
Private-sector organisations create broad programmes of messages to frame discussions of 
public policy issues (Conrad and McIntush, 2003). Annual report narratives are effective means 
to communicate such messages as they convey particular meanings and outcomes (Stanton and 
Stanton, 2002) and respond to pressure from the public and policy makers (Walden and 
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Schwartz, 1997). If a public policy adversely affects certain stakeholders, but remains attractive 
to a private-sector organisation, managers have incentives to engage in impression 
management to influence and shape users’ perceptions of the private-sector organisation and/or 
the public policy. Our thesis that impression management in annual reports influences 
perceptions of public policy is one of many influences. We believe it is an appropriate lens 
through which to view PFI annual report narratives in that, at the very least, the use of 
impression management reflects what managers might think influences public policy. 
 
There are a number of theories on narrative disclosures in annual reports (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan 2007). The dominant assumption is that managers provide useful incremental 
information to investors who are capable of assessing reporting bias therein. Alternatively, in 
disclosing information managers are assumed to be opportunistic – to manage the impressions 
of a range of stakeholders. Finally, some proponents of the opportunistic perspective believe 
investors see through managerial bias. They regard impression management as “executive 
hyperbole”, i.e. a harmless corporate reporting ritual with no capital market consequences 
(Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007, p. 120). In eight papers that tested the competing 
incremental information versus impression management hypotheses, Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan (2007) find support for the impression management perspective. Thus, in this research 
we adopt an impression management perspective, while acknowledging that such an 
assumption is open to challenge. We focus on impression management by preparers. We do 
not test the effect of impression management on readers of PFI annual reports. We cannot 
conclude therefore whether impression management influences readers or they see through it 
as irritating noise. Analysis of managers’ narratives concerning public policy is interesting 
because it reveals managers’ attitudes towards that public policy. 
 
This paper responds to earlier research by Amernic and Craig (2004, p. 33) that 
“Pronouncements of public policy by isolated, powerful elites ought to be subjected to vigorous 
scrutiny and broader discussion. There are many potential benefits in exposing the 
assumptions, ideologies and metaphors that underlie the self-serving rhetoric in statements of 
public policy by mega-corporations”. We examine for the first time the portrayal of public 
policy in annual report narratives. We study self-interested corporate influence on PFI public-
policy development through an impression management lens, in particular, the corporate 
reporting practices of private-sector organisations involved in PFI. We use manual content 
analysis to analyse the PFI-related annual report narratives of three UK PFI private-sector 
companies for impression management, as a legitimating tool, during two periods of significant 
change in PFI public-policy development. We provide insights on organisational impression 
management strategies during periods of public-policy uncertainty which affect those private-
sector organisations. Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2011) conceptualise impression management 
as: self-serving bias, symbolic management and accounting rhetoric. We consider impression 
management as symbolic management involving “any behaviour by a person that has the 
purpose of controlling or manipulating the attributions and impressions formed of that person 
by others” (Tedeschi and Riess, 1981, p. 3). We adopt a legitimacy perspective, assuming that 
the need for private-sector organisations to appear to conform to social rules and norms 
motivates impression management (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2011). This study takes an 
incremental step towards understanding impression management in an alternative contextual 







Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, prior research has applied an 
impression management lens to study its influence on perceptions of organisational legitimacy 
(e.g. Hooghiemstra, 2000; Ogden and Clarke, 2005; Beelitz and Merkl-Davies, 2012). We 
extend our understanding of how private-sector organisations use corporate reporting in a 
contested context for legitimacy purposes both to legitimate themselves and to legitimate a 
Government policy, which financially benefits them. Thus, we examine a unique legitimacy 
case: the need to manage both private-sector organisational legitimacy and legitimacy of a 
heavily criticised public policy. Second, by highlighting the role that corporate reporting plays 
in supporting public policy in the form of PFI public-policy development, we provide insights 
on a possible source of influence that has furthered the cause for PFI. 
 
We find that impression management is used to portray an accurate, but favourable view both 
of the private-sector organisations and of PFI public policy to alleviate concerns and provide 
credibility for the policy. Our analysis emphasises the importance of the role of corporate 
reporting as a source of legitimacy. The paper proceeds as follows: We discuss the background 
and criticisms of UK PFI in Section two. Section three considers corporate reporting from a 
legitimacy perspective. We outline the research questions and methodology in Section four. 
We discuss the results in Section five and the paper concludes in Section six. 
 
2. Background and criticisms of UK PFI 
PFI was introduced in the UK by the then UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, 
in his 1992 Autumn Statement. This occurred against a backdrop of infrastructure deficits, 
particularly in the transport and healthcare sectors (House of Commons, 2011c; Shaoul et al., 
2011), and an increased interest in private-sector management styles, labelled “New Public 
Management” (Hood, 1995). Following its introduction, the UK Government saw PFI as a way 
to secure infrastructure investment without putting pressure on State finances (Dawson, 2001; 
Toms et al., 2011). The tension between public-sector objectives to meet social needs, and 
private-sector goals of profit maximisation (Jones and Pendlebury, 2010), led to concerns that 
PFI was prioritising the needs of the private sector. Price et al. (1999, p. 9) criticised PFI 
projects as “profit-making ventures for the private sector”. Criticisms intensified as the private 
sector secured high investor rate of returns on a number of PFI projects (National Audit Office, 
2006).  
 
These concerns made it difficult for Government to continue to defend PFI solely in terms of 
its ability to fund new infrastructure. Accordingly, following its election in 1997, “New 
Labour” (a slogan at the time for the British labour party) rebranded PFI as Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP), changing the focus from private finance to partnership. In addition, New 
Labour stated that “PFI is all about … improved value for money” (Treasury Taskforce, 1998, 
p. 8), i.e. the realisation of economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Shaoul, 2005). Value for 
money is primarily achieved through “risk transfer”, where the public sector transfers project 
risks (for example, construction risk) to the private sector. Value for money is assessed through 
a cost comparison with traditional public-sector procurement options. 
 
Yet, over time, PFI has been criticised, damaging the policy’s public image thereby placing the 
policy under threat. Heald (2003) and Shaoul (2005) suggest that evaluation of PFI frequently 
encompasses a misunderstanding of value for money which, in any event, is rarely achieved 
(Gaffney et al., 1999b; Reeves, 2008). Risk transfer claims are often exaggerated (Gaffney et 
al., 1999b; Pollock et al., 2011) and conceptually flawed (Shaoul, 2005). Shaoul (2005) and 
Khadaroo (2008) consider the methodology used to compare PFI versus traditional public-
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sector procurement favours PFI through bias and manipulation, as government departments 
became aware that projects would only be approved when financed through PFI (Price et al., 
1999). The high costs of PFI financing compromised the affordability of projects in the health 
sector (Gaffney et al., 1999a), forcing reductions in capacity and services (Gaffney et al., 
1999c; Pollock et al., 2011). A House of Lords’ (2010) report echoed criticisms concerning the 
questionable extent of risk transfer and the methodology applied in PFI versus public-sector 
comparisons. The 2008 credit crisis exacerbated problems in the UK as the cost of private 
finance increased, while its availability decreased. Projects continued to be signed despite the 
absence of value-for-money assurances (National Audit Office, 2010). A later House-of-
Commons report (2011a, p. 3) concluded that PFI should be used “as sparingly as possible until 
the … Value for Money … and absolute cost problems associated with PFI at present have 
been addressed”. 
 
These criticisms reflect the desire of PFI critics for its abolition and raise questions about the 
enduring support of PFI by the UK Government in light of suggestions of a flawed policy. 
Abolition is a real threat. For example, Agyenim-Boateng et al. (2017) study one type of PPP, 
abolished in 2010. 
 
Our longitudinal study covers two periods of change in the development of PFI. Period one, 
1997-1999, commenced with the election of Tony Blair as UK Prime Minister in 1997, during 
whose term the number of PFI projects increased significantly because of his support for the 
policy (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). On average six projects[1] were signed per month 
between 1997 and 1999. The period ends in 1999 as a review of PFI recommended changes to 
the policy (HM Treasury, 1999). Period two, 2007-2010, features liquidity pressures in 2007 
which damaged market confidence, leaving PFI projects without access to bond finance in 
capital markets and to bank finance following the credit crisis (National Audit Office, 2010). 
The number of PFI projects decreased. On average 1.5 projects[1] were signed per month 
between 2007 and 2010. The second period ends in 2010 when the Government announced a 
reform of PFI. We examine these two periods, as the expansion of PFI, paralleled with 
increasing criticism and an uncertain future, increased the requirement for legitimacy to be 
maintained. The longitudinal study provides an opportunity to review how impression 
management strategies change in response to increasing contestation prompting private-sector 
organisations to engage in legitimation. We expect impression management to legitimise the 
public policy in both periods. However, in Period 1, PFI was new and needed to gain 
legitimacy, whereas we expect impression management to intensify in Period 2, following the 
heavy criticism of the policy and the need to maintain its legitimacy. 
 
3. Legitimacy framework of corporate annual reporting 
Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. Legitimacy premises a social contract: that 
stakeholders permit organisations to exist if their actions are congruent with social values 
(Deegan, 2002). Aware of their stakeholders’ perceptions, organisations respond to changes in 
their operational environment to prevent a legitimacy gap (Samkin and Schneider, 2010). 
Legitimation is the process whereby organisations justify their activities, by gaining or 
maintaining or repairing legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Samkin and Schneider, 2010). The PFI 
private-sector companies must persuade audiences with conflicting needs: namely their own 
shareholders who have self-serving profit motives; and other stakeholders in society, including 
Government and government departments, politicians and the public. This conflict plays out in 
the types of legitimacy the PFI private-sector companies seek. Suchman (1995) identifies three 
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primary forms of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy 
is aimed at organisations’ immediate audiences. In our case, there are two audiences: PFI 
private-sector company shareholders and external stakeholders, particularly those involved in 
public policy making. Pragmatic legitimacy requires the PFI private-sector companies to 
persuade their shareholders that, despite its contested nature, PFI continues to align with 
shareholders’ self-interested need for financial returns and to persuade policy makers that PFI 
is a good public policy, which delivers value for money for taxpayers. Pragmatic legitimacy 
has three sub-forms: exchange, influence and dispositional legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Our 
paper focuses on exchange legitimacy, which relates to perceptions of PFI’s usefulness to 
shareholders who, in return, support their PFI private-sector firms. Influence legitimacy and 
dispositional legitimacy relate to audience responses/reactions, which we do not consider in 
this research. While pragmatic legitimacy is aimed at shareholders, the PFI private-sector 
companies seek moral legitimacy from other societal stakeholders. Moral legitimacy requires 
the PFI private-sector companies to persuade their societal stakeholders that the pursuit of PFI 
is the right thing to do from a moral perspective. We focus on organisational efforts to gain and 
maintain moral legitimacy from the accomplishments achieved through PFI (consequential 
legitimacy) and from the ‘discrete routines’ followed in implementing PFI (procedural 
legitimacy) (Suchman, 1995, p. 581). Other sub-forms of moral legitimacy are beyond the 
scope of our research, including the organisational structure of PFI private-sector companies 
(structural legitimacy) and the charisma of their leaders (personal legitimacy). Both pragmatic 
and moral legitimacy “rest on discursive evaluation” (Suchman, 1995, p. 585) such as through 
the study of annual report narratives. Cognitive legitimacy involves the simple acceptance of 
an organisation based on the assumptions audiences have about organisations (Durocher et al., 
2007). As our research focuses on the preparer perspective, we do not consider cognitive 
legitimacy. 
 
3.1 The need for legitimacy 
Organisations’ legitimacy is partly controlled by their affiliations and the industry in which 
they operate (Vendelø, 1998; Hooghiemstra, 2000). The socially constructed perception that 
PFI is flawed threatens not only the legitimacy of PFI public policy but also the legitimacy of 
PFI private-sector companies themselves arising from their pursuit and continued support for 
the undesirable PFI public policy (see Section 2). Thus, the UK PFI public policy provides an 
interesting case for exploring legitimation, as the PFI private-sector companies face the 
conflicting need to legitimise social perceptions concerning the PFI public-policy image as 
well as their own corporate image. PFI is profitable for PFI private-sector companies (see 
Section 2) and represents a significant proportion of their turnover (Smy, 2003), thus the 
importance to them of PFI public-policy image. Martin Laing, chairman of the Laing group 
“demanded” the Government to take further steps to ensure PFIs’ survival (Gosling, 1996). 
Carillion’s chairman claimed PFI critics “do not understand” PFI and attempted to create a 
positive image for PFI by insisting the “public sector is simply not going to have to pay the 
bills in the future” (Prynn, 2000). Image of PFI private-sector organisations is important in 
attracting investment since corporations are “controlled […] by community concerns […] and 
values” (Stanton and Stanton, 2002, p. 490-491). 
 
3.2 Legitimating strategies and impression management 
Organisations engage in legitimation either through substantive action or through symbolic 
management (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Substantive action involves real changes in activities, 
while symbolic management involves symbolic strategies to change stakeholder perceptions. 
Given the financial benefits that PFI affords private-sector companies, we argue PFI companies 
are better off engaging in symbolic management rather than the substantive action of ending 
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their profitable PFI-related activities. Annual report narratives provide a medium through 
which PFI private-sector companies can engage in symbolic management to legitimise PFI 
public policy, for example, by discussing its positive characteristics. 
 
Organisations engaging in legitimation via annual report narratives use impression 
management (Samkin and Schneider; 2010; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2013). Impression 
management is a purposeful, conscious undertaking to control or influence audience 
perceptions (Tedeschi and Riess, 1981). In a corporate reporting context, impression 
management attempts to “control and manipulate the impression conveyed to users of 
accounting information” such as in unaudited narratives (Clatworthy and Jones, 2001, p. 311). 
Leary and Kowalski (1990) develop a two-component impression management model entailing 
two processes: impression motivation and impression construction. Impression motivation 
explains the conditions under which managers are motivated to engage in impression 
management, while impression construction refers to both the desired impression and the 
behaviours used to manage this impression. PFI company managers are motivated to engage 
in impression management to make PFI appear more legitimate. The companies desire both a 
positive PFI public policy image and a positive corporate self-image. Figure 1 summarises the 
analytical framework applied in the research, which we developed from Suchman’s (1995) 
legitimacy framework.When constructing impressions, the PFI private-sector companies seek 
to gain, maintain and repair legitimacy using diverse legitimation strategies. Legitimation 
strategies to gain legitimacy are proactive and fall on a “continuum from relative passive 
conformity to relatively active manipulation” (Suchman, 1995, p. 587). Our research focuses 
on the legitimation strategy of “manipulate environments”, as it involves creating new 
audiences or new legitimating beliefs (Suchman, 1995, p. 591). Other strategies to gain 
legitimacy, including selection among environments and conformity to environments, are not 
within the scope of impression management. To gain pragmatic and moral legitimacy, the PFI 
private-sector companies should “advertise” PFI and their role in PFI and be persuasive by 
demonstrating success (Suchman, 1995). For this reason, we examine impression management 
strategies that focus on establishing positive identities, building positive reputational 
characteristics, persuasion and promotion of PFI public policy and the PFI private-sector 
companies themselves. In Section 4, we identify these impression management strategies as 
assertive/defensive strategies, rhetorical association/disassociation strategies and PFI-policy 
promotion v PFI private-company self-promotion. Legitimation strategies to maintain 
legitimacy are “protective” and include “perceiving future changes” and “protecting past 
accomplishments” (Suchman, 1995, p. 594). Our paper focuses on both of these strategies, as 
PFI private-sector companies would need to strengthen existing legitimacy and guard against 
changing audience demands in light of increased threats against PFI in Period 2 (including the 
credit crisis and critical reports on private-sector profits from PFI). Changing audience 
demands could entail reduction in shareholder appetite to invest in PFI private sector 
companies and/or reduction in government appetite to build public sector infrastructure using 
PFI finance. To maintain pragmatic and moral legitimacy, the PFI private-sector companies 
should intensify use of those strategies to gain legitimacy in Period 1 but also “police 
responsibility”, “communicate authoritatively” and “stockpile esteem” (Suchman, 1995, p. 
600). For this reason, we examine impression management strategies that focus on 
responsibility, language and recognition. In Section 4, we identify these impression 
management strategies as assertive/defensive strategies, rhetorical association/disassociation 
strategies, PFI-policy promotion vs PFI private-sector company self-promotion, attribution and 
selectivity. Legitimation strategies to repair legitimacy are reactive (Suchman, 1995). Our 
paper focuses on the legitimation strategy of “normalizing accounts”, as “restructure” and 
“don’t panic” are not within the scope of impression management (Suchman, 1995, p. 597). To 
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repair pragmatic and moral legitimacy, PFI private-sector companies tend to excuse or explain 
their involvement in PFI. For this reason, we examine impression management strategies that 
focus on justification. This can manifest as defensive explanation or external attribution. We 
identify these impression management strategies as assertive/defensive strategies and 
attribution.  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
4. Research questions and methodology 
This section outlines the six research questions and the approach taken to analyse PFI-related 
annual report narratives.  
 
4.1 Research questions 
The paper focuses on the contested nature of PFIs, the implicit hypothesis being that the more 
contested an issue is, the more legitimation is required, both in terms of attention (proxied in 
the form of space devoted to the issue) (RQ1) and in terms of framing the issue in a way that 
ensures audience support (RQ2-RQ6). This hypothesis is tested by means of comparing annual 
report disclosures on PFIs during two time periods (Period 1 less contested vs. Period 2 more 
contested).[2] As a proxy for the importance managers put on PFI, we commence our empirical 
analysis by analysing the proportion of annual report narratives devoted to PFI narratives, 
comparing these between the two time periods (Jetty and Beattie, 2009), leading to the 
following research question.  
 
RQ1:  What proportion of annual report narratives comprise PFI narratives? 
RQ1a:  Is there any variation in the proportion of PFI narratives between the two time periods 
of the study? 
 
Impression management research attempts to understand the strategies pursued by 
organisations in framing external stakeholders’ impressions of their activities. We contribute 
to the literature by examining whether impression management is used to manage impressions 
of both PFI public policy and of PFI private-sector organisations. We examine four impression 
management strategies: Assertive/defensive strategies, rhetorical association/disassociation 
strategies, attribution and selectivity. 
 
Given the threatening and contested context of this research, in which PFI is subject to 
extensive criticism, we categorise PFI-related annual report narratives between assertive and 
defensive statements (Brennan et al. 2010; Ogden and Clarke, 2005; Samkin and Schneider, 
2010). When faced with legitimacy threats, PFI private-sector companies can either attempt to 
assertively gain and maintain legitimacy by establishing a positive identity and build positive 
reputational characteristics for PFI and their role as PFI private-sector companies or they can 
defend undesirable qualities of PFI and their position as PFI supporters. We examine 
impression management as a function of assertive or defensive statements (rather than good or 
bad news concerning financial performance – “good news” concerning the profitability of PFI 
for these companies is a source of criticism). Assertive strategies include “self-enhancement, 
self-promotion, ingratiation, exemplification, entitlements and enhancements” (Samkin and 
Schneider, 2010, p. 264). Defensive strategies include formulating a normalising account and 
strategic restructuring. Formulating a normalising account includes the “sub-strategies” of 
denial, excuses, justifications, apologies and guilt. Strategic restructuring includes the sub-
strategy of disassociation (Samkin and Schneider, 2010, p. 264). Following Clatworthy and 
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Jones (2003) and Brennan et al. (2010), any statements not classified as either assertive or 
defensive are treated as neutral. Our second research question is: 
 
RQ2:  Are PFI-related annual report narratives characterised by assertive and/or defensive 
strategies?  
RQ2a:  Is there any difference in the use of assertive and/or defensive strategies? 
RQ2b:  Is there any variation in assertive and/or defensive strategies between the two time 
periods of the study? 
 
Effective persuasion can change the perception that PFI is flawed to one where PFI is viewed 
positively. The art of persuasion entails the use of rhetoric (Brennan et al., 2010). The use of 
rhetoric involves linguistic choices by managers to influence meaning (Brennan et al., 2009). 
We consider lexical choices, which involve the choice of words or language (Brennan et al., 
2010), focussing not on “what firms say” but rather “how they say it” (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007, p. 139). We study rhetorical association/disassociation devices reflecting the 
extent to which writers distance themselves from the text: the use of personal pronouns; active 
versus passive voice; and naming strategy. 
 
Clatworthy and Jones (2006) suggest that managers use personal pronouns to associate 
themselves with profitable performance. Aggerholm and Thomsen (2016) examine legitimacy 
creation using micro-level semantic strategies, one of which is “constellation of personal 
pronouns” (p. 203). They find managers use legitimising voices to establish legitimacy by 
adopting micro-level semantic strategies such as the use of “you” versus “we”. Bridwell-
Mitchell and Mezias (2012) consider personal pronouns (“we”) as a useful communication 
strategy to establish cognitive legitimacy among groups in organisational-identity crafting. In 
connection with the discursive legitimation of managerial decisions, Aggerholm and Asmuß 
(2016) find the CEO of a large Danish public knowledge-based organisation uses fewer 
personal pronouns (“we”/“our”) to distance himself from an organisational downsizing 
decision. Following Bournois and Point (2006), we analyse the use of personal pronouns as a 
rhetorical device to “motivate and create a sense of solidarity” (Brennan et al., 2010, p. 259). 
The presence (absence) of pronouns can indicate the level of association with (dissociation 
from) PFI shown by private-sector companies in their annual reports, thus engaging 
(disengaging) users of annual reports to support PFI. 
 
The second rhetorical association/disassociation device involves the use of the passive/active 
voice. Matejek and Gössling (2014) examine legitimacy in the case of the BP Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill. They find the passive voice is used to avoid “questions of responsibility” (p. 
580). Preuss and Dawson (2009) identify the voice of a narrative as contributing towards its 
quality and legitimacy – is the narrative in active or passive voice and/or is there an impersonal 
narrator? The passive voice distances writers from a message through dissociation (Thomas, 
1997; Clatworthy and Jones, 2006). Active constructions are associated with success (Thomas, 
1997). We expect PFI private-sector companies to use the active voice to emphasise their 
support for PFI; the passive voice attempts to distance PFI private-sector companies from PFI 
criticism by obscuring the agent.  
 
A third rhetorical association/disassociation device comprises “naming strategy”, a term we 
propose to reflect the focus of PFI private-sector companies when referring to PFI projects. We 
examine PFI company preferences for PFI or PPP terminology, following Tony Blair’s 
rebranding exercise in 1997 (see Section 2). Increased use of PPP would suggest that the PFI 
private-sector companies respond to financing criticisms by associating with positive benefits 
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of PFI, such as is implied by the term “partnership” and disassociating with the negative 
connotations created from the use of the term “private finance”. Our third research question is: 
 
RQ3: Are PFI-related annual report narratives characterised by the use of rhetorical 
association/disassociation devices?  
RQ3a:  Is there any variation in the use of rhetorical association/disassociation devices between 
the two time periods of the study? 
 
PFI private-sector companies are motivated to portray PFI policies and their own PFI activities 
positively. We label these PFI-policy promotion and PFI private-sector company self-
promotion, respectively. Research question 4 examines which of these two competing 
objectives (promotion of PFI policies versus promotion of PFI private-sector companies and 
their PFI activities) dominates. 
 
RQ4:  Is there any difference in the promotion of (i) PFI public policy (PFI-policy promotion) 
and (ii) PFI private-sector company self-promotion? 
RQ4a:  Is there any variation in the promotion of (i) PFI public policy (PFI-policy promotion) 
and (ii) PFI private-sector company self-promotion between the two time periods of the 
study? 
 
A third impression management strategy is attribution, whereby managers’ performance 
explanations claim responsibility for success and shift the blame for negative outcomes away 
from themselves. Previous research on impression management finds evidence of attribution 
in causal explanations of performance outcomes (see Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007 for a 
review). Most of this research assumes managers act in a self-serving manner by attributing 
positive and negative organisational outcomes to internal and external factors, respectively 
(Aerts, 2001, 2005; Clatworthy and Jones 2003). In this research, we examine internal and 
external causal explanations for the success or failure of PFI outcomes or for the policy 
generally. Our fifth research question is: 
 
RQ5:  Are PFI-related annual report narratives characterised by the use of internal/external 
causal explanations? 
RQ5a:  Is there any variation in the use of internal/external causal explanations between the 
two time periods of the study? 
 
A fourth impression management strategy is selectivity where managers select to report those 
performance numbers that portray the firm in the best possible light (Brennan et al., 2009). The 
profits and returns earned by private-sector companies from PFI projects were a source of 
intense policy criticism (see Section 2). In their discussion of silence as a form of 
communication, Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2017) observe that what organisations do not say 
is an under-researched question. We examine whether PFI private-sector companies exhibit 
selectivity by refraining from reporting on PFI profits and returns in PFI-related narratives 
compared to non-PFI profits and returns in the non-PFI-related narratives. Our sixth research 
question is: 
 
RQ6:  What proportion of returns amounts (monetary, %, etc.) selected for disclosure by PFI 
private-sector companies relate to PFI activities? 
RQ6a:  Is there any variation in the use of selectivity between the two time periods of the study? 
 10 
 
4.2 Research design and company selection 
Our study comprises a longitudinal case study over two time periods of three PFI private-sector 
companies – Carillion plc, Interserve plc and John Laing plc. All three companies: published 
an annual report for each of the seven years under consideration; are leaders in PFI projects – 
they represent the top three issuers of PFI equity in the secondary market between 1998 and 
2010, amounting to 59.8 per cent of these PFI projects (House of Commons, 2011b); were 
involved with PFI projects in both periods under consideration; are closely involved with PFI 
lobbying organisations[3] set up to create a sympathetic environment for PFI and to develop 
close relations with Government and media concerning PFI (Gosling, 2011). We expect these 
companies to engage in strategies to build support for PFI. Carillion identifies PFI as one of its 
key capabilities and itself as a market leader in PFI projects (Carillion, 1997; 2014). Interserve 
manages one of the largest PFI portfolios in the UK and PFI represents a significant source of 
value for the company (Interserve, 2007; 2014). Laing identifies PFI as a primary investment 
activity and worked on the largest PFI hospital contract in the UK (Laing, 1997; 2014). All 
three companies commenced with PFI as a natural development of their existing business. By 
way of context, we provide some key data concerning each company in Table 1. Non-
disclosure of PFI information is a feature of the data. All three companies are consistently 
highly profitable. Comparing Carillion’s percentage of PFI turnover (ranging between 4.0% to 
7.4%) and PFI profit (ranging from 11.0% to 21.1%), it is clear that PFI is significantly more 
profitable than other business of Carillion.  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
4.3 Data collection 
The data comprises the PFI-related annual report narratives of Carillion, Interserve and Laing 
during the two time periods under consideration. We downloaded annual reports for the years 
1997, 1998 and 1999 (Period 1) and 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 (Period 2) for each company 
from their respective company websites or Thompson One Banker. We focus on the PFI-related 
voluntary annual report narratives located before the audited financial statements, including 
within chairmen’s statements, chief executives’ reviews, business and operational reviews and 
financial reviews. We exclude the regulated and more formulaic corporate governance reports, 
including remuneration reports, from the analysis. Annual report narratives are unaudited and 
therefore more prone to impression management (Brennan et al., 2009). Additionally, the 
proximity of the narratives to the audited financial statements provides them with a degree of 
credibility (Neu et al., 1998). We identify PFI-related annual report narratives based on the 
following criteria: mention of “Private Finance Initiative (PFI)” or “Public Private Partnership 
(PPP)”; mention of “privately financed infrastructure/project”; reference to “design”, “build”, 
“finance”, “operate”; and reference to a project identified within the annual report as a PFI 
project. If an annual report narrative section is captioned with either PFI, PPP or an identified 
PFI project by name, then we code that entire section. 
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4.4 Content analysis and analytical framework 
To address RQ1, we compare the proportion of PFI-related narratives with the total annual 
report narratives. Then, we adopt manual, meaning-orientated content analysis of the annual 
report narratives (Smith and Taffler, 2000). Brennan et al. (2009, p. 801) state that “impression 
management techniques are subtle and sophisticated, and therefore, complex, and warrant 
manual content analysis”. Manual meaning-oriented content analysis allows consideration of 
words in their immediate surrounding textual context. We study four impression management 
strategies: assertive/defensive strategies analysis of PFI themes; rhetorical 
association/disassociation devices to influence perceptions; attribution of positive and negative 
PFI outcomes; and selectivity of profit/return disclosures.  
 
We choose statements as the unit of analysis for the purposes of content analysis for RQ2. We 
code each statement as either assertive or defensive. An assertive statement attempts to 
establish a positive identity or reputational characteristics for PFI public policy or PFI private-
sector companies. PFI private-sector companies can establish a positive reputation for PFI 
public policy by (a) commending the policy, operationalised by reference to 
“Awards/Recognition” and “Partnership” (b) presenting positive developments, “Development 
– Positive” or (c) highlighting opportunities for the policy, “Opportunity”. PFI private-sector 
companies can establish a positive reputation for themselves by (a) self-promotion or (b) self-
enhancement. Jones and Pittman (1982) describe self-promotion as self-characterisation to 
increase attractiveness by claiming competence in general. We operationalise self-promotion 
by reference to “Internal Activities” and “Investment Activities” where PFI private-sector 
companies celebrate their proficiency to win, close, construct, operate and invest in PFI 
projects. Self-enhancement involves “gaining the approbation of a particular audience” (Ogden 
and Clarke, 2005, p. 322). Based on Suchman (1995), we define self-enhancement as PFI 
private-sector companies presenting themselves as valid practitioners or qualified to carry out 
PFI projects. We operationalise self-enhancement as “Progress” where PFI private-sector 
companies talk of their progress, and “Expertise/Leadership” where PFI private-sector 
companies claim expertise in PFI and leadership in PFI projects. A defensive statement is one 
which attempts to address negative criticisms by (a) dissociation from these negative aspects, 
(b) providing excuses or justifications for negative outcomes and (c) minimising the 
consequences of negative aspects. Suchman (1995, p. 597) suggests that defensive statements 
are usually a “reactive response”. We categorise defensive statements as “Development – 
Negative”, “Challenges – Internal”, “Challenges – External”, “PFI Characteristics” and “PFI 
Alternatives”. We code PFI Characteristics as defensive because these statements concern 
criticised characteristics of PFI requiring defence by the PFI private-sector companies. 
Similarly, we code PFI Alternatives as defensive as the PFI private-sector companies used 
financing alternatives to PFI to defensively justify their involvement in infrastructure 
development. 
 
In summary, as shown in Table 2, we categorise assertive and defensive statements into eight 
and five categories respectively.  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
For RQ3, we classify rhetorical association/disassociation strategies using three types of 
rhetorical association/disassociation devices: (a) Use of first person and third person personal 




To address RQ4, we identify how many times references to PFI public policy and PFI private-
sector companies are made. This allows us to distinguish between impression management to 
legitimise the PFI public policy and the PFI private-sector companies themselves.  
 
For RQ5, we define an attributional statement as a phrase or a sentence in which a PFI outcome 
is linked with a reason or a cause for the outcome so that the attributional statements reflects 
“a definite and logical antecedent-consequence relationship” (Aerts, 2001, p. 13). Following 
Aerts (2005), we identify causal explanations by causal conjunctions or causal connecting 
phrases (e.g. because of) or verbs that refer to an explicit explanation (e.g. lead to). We 
categorise each attributional statement on three dimensions: whether the PFI outcome is 
positive or negative; whether the outcome is attributed to an internal or an external cause; and 
the causal explanation. We suggest PFI private-sector companies will attribute negative PFI 
outcomes to external factors and positive PFI outcomes to internal factors. 
 
For RQ6, we compare the number of references to PFI profit or returns in PFI-related narratives 
with the number of references to non-PFI profit or returns in the non-PFI-related narratives. 
The non-PFI related narratives consist of voluntary narratives that were not coded as part of 
the initial coding analysis. We identify profit- and return-related narratives where any of the 
following terms are used: ‘profit’; ‘returns’; ‘gains’; ‘earnings’; ‘shareholder value’; and 
‘margins’. 
 
A detailed set of coding instructions supports the coding categories.[4] We tested coding 
reliability through several rounds of pre-testing, resulting in refinement of the coding 
instructions. The lead author completed the coding. Two researchers each independently coded 
a 10 per cent sample – both senior professors/experienced researchers, one a co-author of the 
paper – resulting in an 89.88 per cent level of agreement, meeting the desired level of agreement 
suggested by Riffe et al. (2008). In total, we analysed 1,672 PFI-related statements: 269 in 
Period 1 and 1,403 in Period 2. Table 3 summarises the dataset. 
 
The dataset in Period 2 is much larger than Period 1. Accordingly, we scale the numbers for 
the differences in dataset size. We scaled up all Period 1 data by a scaling factor based on the 
% increase in the size of the annual report dataset (by words) between Period 1 and Period 2.[5] 
We then run Mann Whitney U tests of differences in means between the two periods.  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
5. Results and discussion 
We discuss our results by reference to each research question, each section commencing with 
quantitative analysis, followed by discussion of the evidence.  
 
5.1 PFI-related annual report narratives (RQ1) 
Table 4 shows significantly increased PFI-related annual report narratives in Period 2 over 
Period 1 (RQ1). PFI was new in Period 1. By Period 2, the companies were doing more PFI 
business, recognising it as an important revenue stream. In addition, PFI was more visible as a 
public policy in the UK and around the world. In the UK, the House of Lords placed PFI under 
heavy criticism, calling for it to end. Thus, increased business, together with increased 
contestation leading to a greater need for legitimising PFI public policy, is likely to explain the 
increase in PFI-related annual report narratives.  
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(Table 4 about here) 
 
5.2 Assertive/defensive strategies (RQ2) 
The PFI private-sector companies faced a conflicting challenge to convince readers of their 
annual reports that, despite public criticisms, PFI is a sound public policy prioritising the needs 
of society (moral legitimacy). At the same time, the PFI private-sector companies had to 
convince their shareholders of good investment returns (pragmatic legitimacy). Table 5 
summarises our analysis of assertive/defensive strategies. Mann Whitney U tests of differences 
in means show that defensive statements are significantly less frequent than assertive 
statements (RQ2a). We suggest the PFI private-sector companies prefer to proactively appeal 
to their shareholders that PFI continues to present profitable opportunities as well as to their 
other stakeholders regarding social benefits of PFI. Mann Whitney U tests of differences in 
means between the two periods show a significant increase in the use of assertive and defensive 
statements between Period 1 and Period 2 (RQ2b). This reflects a desire for the PFI private-
sector companies to respond to the increasing external challenges facing PFI, in part due to the 
credit crisis and the heightened awareness of difficulties facing the policy. 
 
(Table 5 about here) 
 
Assertive statements dominate. During Period 1, the PFI private-sector companies seek 
pragmatic and moral legitimacy through self-promotion and self-enhancement. The PFI 
private-sector companies refer to their accomplishments (Internal Activities), made possible 
using their expertise (Expertise/Leadership) in PFI, to gain consequential legitimacy (a sub-
form of moral legitimacy) for their PFI operations from their societal stakeholders. Since fewer 
PFI projects were operational in Period 1, the PFI private-sector companies reference their 
accomplishments in relation to the goals they pursue for PFI. The PFI private-sector companies 
celebrate the progress of PFI (Progress) to gain exchange legitimacy (a sub-form of pragmatic 
legitimacy) from their shareholders by referring to the usefulness of PFI in light of budget cuts 
that now make traditional procurement methods difficult.  
 
During Period 2, the PFI private-sector companies focus on projects reaching financial close 
and operation (Internal Activities) and Investment Activities. The focus on the financial and 
investment usefulness of PFI reflects attempts by the PFI private-sector companies to maintain 
exchange legitimacy with their shareholders. Consequential legitimacy, arises from the 
perception that PFI, as an organisational outcome, is the right thing to do. The PFI private-
sector companies challenge perceptions that PFI is flawed by frequently commenting on their 
progress in PFI (Progress) and the positive market outlook for PFI (Opportunity). By 
highlighting their progress, the PFI private-sector companies can protect their “past 
accomplishments” by shifting their accomplishments from an ideological goal to a tangible 
benefit. For example, the continued progress of PFI in Period 2 illustrates the ongoing (rather 
than episodic) tangible benefits of PFI (Suchman, 1995, p. 594). By emphasising future 
opportunities, the PFI private-sector companies seek to further maintain consequential 
legitimacy by “foresee[ing] emerging challenges” (Suchman, 1995, p. 595) through 
influencing their societal stakeholders that PFI is not a “dead” policy, as critics would suggest, 
but that PFIs’ value continues to be recognised in the UK and internationally. As a sub-form 
of moral legitimacy, procedural legitimacy arises from the perception that the use of PFI as an 
infrastructure procurement method is right. PFI-policy promotion is strengthened when the PFI 
private-sector companies reference Awards/Recognition. By entering PFI projects for award, 
the PFI private-sector companies open PFI to public scrutiny, requiring validation of PFI as a 
procedure. The awards that PFI receives allow the PFI private-sector companies to align with 
 14 
the values of societal stakeholders by illustrating how they have embraced socially accepted 
techniques and procedures. 
 
The PFI private-sector companies use few defensive statements in Period 1. Defensive 
statements are reserved to repair legitimacy in Period 2 following a dramatic drop in the number 
of PFI projects and calls for it to end. The PFI private-sector companies repair legitimacy by 
formulating a normalising account to excuse negative PFI outcomes (see RQ5). These consist 
mainly of claims that negative aspects of PFI are not the fault of the company or of PFI public 
policy itself, but rather of existing conditions. This helps the PFI private-sector companies to 
repair moral legitimacy based on claims that the policy itself is flawed. 
 
5.3 Rhetorical association/disassociation strategies (RQ3) 
We address rhetorical association/disassociation strategies on three dimensions: (a) use of 
pronouns, (b) use of active and passive voice, and (c) use of naming strategy (PFI or PPP 
terminology). Mann Whitney U tests of differences in means between the two periods show a 
significant increase in the use of all three rhetorical association/disassociation devices in Period 
2 (Table 6). This suggests a greater awareness by the PFI companies of the need to associate 
with positive PFI outcomes in a more contested, challenging and uncertain environment. 
 
(Table 6 about here) 
 
5.3.1 Personal pronouns 
In Period 1, 85.8 per cent of pronoun use comprises self-references. In Period 2, self-references 
increase to 88.3 per cent (Table 6). We argue that the PFI private-sector companies use first 
person pronouns to associate with PFI public policy. These strong associations with the policy 
appeal to the value system of their shareholders and societal stakeholders as “technical 
properties … are socially defined and do not exist in a concrete sense” (Durocher and Fortin, 
2010, p. 480). The PFI private-sector companies use self-references to communicate 
authoritatively and thereby gain and maintain pragmatic and moral legitimacy; that PFI is 
useful and it is the right thing to do. 
 
5.3.2 Active or passive voice 
The PFI private-sector companies primarily use the active voice in both Period 1 and Period 2 
as an association rhetorical device to gain and maintain legitimacy. In Period 1/ Period 2, 
79.6/83.3 per cent of PFI-related annual report narratives are in the active voice (Table 6). We 
suggest the PFI private-sector companies use active statements to promote PFI as moving 
forward and successful (Thomas, 1997). As PFI faced uncertainty, the PFI private-sector 
companies (who relied on the future of PFI) needed to closely associate with the policy to 
suggest confidence whilst portraying PFI as a progressive initiative. The active voice is 
preferable to passive statements when seeking pragmatic and moral legitimacy, since passive 
statements give the impression of the PFI private-sector companies distancing themselves from 
the policy. This could have threatened the PFI public-policy image further by creating the 
impression of PFI private-sector companies reluctant to engage with PFI. 
 
5.3.4 Naming strategy (PFI or PPP terminology) 
PFI terminology dominates (96.5%) compared with PPP terminology (3.5%) in Period 1. Use 
of PPP versus PFI terminology increases in Period 2 (57.7% versus 42.3%). In Period 2, 
Carillion almost exclusively used the term PPP. Laing uses both terms, while Interserve uses 
PFI. Following Blair’s rebrand of PFI to PPP, we suggest Carillion and Laing attempt to 
associate with the partnership benefits of PFI compared to the more criticised private-finance 
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terminology to seek procedural legitimacy. By aligning their statements with social 
preferences, they highlight PFI as a tool to achieve partnership and value for money rather than 
as a means to take advantage of high returns. Thus, increased use of PPP generally, together 
with greater need to maintain moral legitimacy for PFI public policy to society in particular, is 
likely to explain the increase in PPP use.  
 
5.4 PFI-policy promotion versus PFI private-sector company self-promotion (RQ4) 
To change the perception that PFI is flawed, all three companies employ PFI-policy promotion 
to build a positive reputation for PFI in preference to PFI private-sector company self-
promotion (Table 7). Mann Whitney U tests show a significant difference in the use of PFI-
policy promotion versus PFI private-sector company self-promotion. This reflects the desire 
by PFI private-sector companies to gain and maintain procedural legitimacy, as procedural 
legitimacy seeks to create the perception that PFI is the right way to invest in infrastructure. 
The use of both PFI-policy promotion and PFI private-sector company self-promotion 
significantly increases between the two time periods. In Period 2, the PFI private-sector 
companies had to be pro-active in maintaining PFI legitimacy in response to increasing 
uncertainty following the 2008 credit crisis in the UK. 
 
(Table 7 about here) 
 
5.5 Attribution (RQ5) 
The results in Table 8 present a mixed picture of the use of causal explanations by PFI private-
sector companies in relation to PFI outcomes. All 56 attributional statements are in Period 2. 
We do not perform statistical analysis for RQ5, due to small numbers. First, all negative PFI 
outcomes are attributed to external factors. These include economic external factors, such as 
the credit crisis (13 statements) and political external factors, including elections (5 
statements), lack of Government support (2 statements) and Government reviews/regulations 
(7 statements). As expected, no negative PFI outcomes are attributed to internal factors. As 
shareholders started to reduce their commitment to PFI and PFI came under heavy societal 
criticism, these findings reflect a desire by PFI private-sector companies to repair legitimacy 
by excusing negative PFI outcomes to external factors. The PFI private-sector companies 
formulate a normalising account by not attributing negative outcomes to specific PFI 
characteristics, implying that economic and political factors could affect other policies equally. 
Social psychology literature would predict a tendency for managers to claim more 
responsibility for successes. This research finds that positive PFI outcomes are not wholly 
attributed to internal factors. Of the 29 positive PFI outcomes, 10 statements provide an internal 
causal attribution, while 19 statements provide an external causal explanation. All internal 
attributions are explained by PFI company skills. The external attributions are explained by 
Government reviews/regulations (11 statements), Government support (7 statements), and 
elections (1 statement). These attributional statements seek to reinforce the moral legitimacy 
of PFI. 
 
(Table 8 about here) 
 
5.6 Selectivity (RQ6) 
PFI private-sector companies speak about profit and returns in annual report narratives almost 
equally in both periods, despite the increase in size of the annual reports. However, PFI private-
sector companies report their profits or returns significantly less frequently when talking about 
PFI compared to when they talk about non-PFI aspects of the business (Table 9). When the PFI 
private-sector companies speak about PFI returns, they want to distance their profits and returns 
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from negative PFI criticism often by linking PFI returns to social rather than shareholder needs. 
The infrequent references to PFI profit/returns, combined with the lack of disclosures 
concerning proportions of turnover and profit linked to PFI activities (see Table 1), is a form 
of silence. Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2017) consider silence an important means of corporate 
communication that deserves more attention from shareholders and stakeholders. The PFI 
private-sector companies have the opportunity to disclose PFI profit/returns and/or 
turnover/profit arising from PFI yet, in general, they choose not to. This suggests managers of 
PFI private-sector companies are motivated to maintain moral legitimacy by disclosing less 
information concerning PFI profits/returns in light of increasing criticisms concerning these 
profits/returns. 
 
(Table 9 about here) 
 
6. Conclusions 
Understanding the source, extent and implications of corporate influence on PFI public policy 
is important, as the UK Government continues to harness private-sector investment expertise 
via PFI. We acknowledge that influences on the development of PFI public policy can come 
from different sources. Within Government, political parties that accept its value can influence 
its progression by supporting the public policy with resources. External to Government, the 
private sector plays a role in influencing PFI public policy. For example, PFI private-sector 
companies promote a positive image of the public policy through lobbying organisations[3] 
and linking the delivery of modern public infrastructure to the success of PFI (Gosling, 2011). 
We address a further possible source of influence from the private sector – the use of annual 
report narratives to influence perceptions of PFI. 
 
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we illustrate how PFI private-sector 
companies use impression management strategies to manage organisational legitimacy and 
public policy legitimacy when these are in conflict. PFI private-sector companies considered 
PFI within their annual report narratives in both time periods, with a significant increase in 
PFI-related narratives in Period 2 (RQ1). Whilst we cannot conclude whether readers are 
influenced by these narratives, our analysis has demonstrated the ways in which PFI private-
sector companies have used impression management in their annual reports to manage 
legitimacy for PFI public policy and private-sector companies’ validity as PFI supporters. 
Addressing RQ2, results of content analysis suggest that assertive statements characterise PFI-
related annual report narratives. We found few defensive statements. The PFI private-sector 
companies preferred to gain and maintain pragmatic and moral legitimacy by referencing 
accomplishments in line with stakeholders’ value system and addressing stakeholder 
expectations with tangible benefits. This helped assure society that PFI was not flawed and was 
able to meet society’s needs. In relation to RQ3, self-references, the active voice and PPP 
terminology were all used to gain and maintain pragmatic and moral legitimacy by associating 
with the value system of their stakeholders. Addressing RQ4, results suggest that the PFI 
private-sector companies used PFI-policy promotion significantly more than PFI private-sector 
company self-promotion to gain and maintain legitimacy by elevating PFI to align with social 
values. RQ5 reveals the need to repair pragmatic and moral legitimacy by associating negative 
PFI outcomes to external factors. Desire to manage moral legitimacy is also reflected in RQ6, 
where we found that PFI private-sector companies chose to remain silent and not to disclose 
information relating to PFI profit/returns when compared to non-PFI profit/returns.  
 
We observe that in Period 1, PFI private-sector companies preferred to gain legitimacy by 
manipulating their environments using assertive statements, association rhetorical devices and 
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PFI-policy promotion. This strategy was preferred over “conform[ing] to environments” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 587) by ending PFI activities or selecting alternative contexts in which to 
pursue PFI. In Period 2, PFI private-sector companies faced a challenging task to maintain 
legitimacy amidst criticism. PFI private-sector companies protected their accomplishments 
using assertive statements that highlighted tangible benefits. Assertive statements, association 
rhetorical devices, PFI-policy promotion, internal attributions and selectivity were used to 
attempt to influence audiences’ changing demands concerning the future of PFI, a strategy 
Suchman (1995, p. 594) calls “perceiving future changes”. The PFI private-sector companies 
used defensive statements and external attribution as normalising accounts to repair legitimacy 
in response to the credit crisis, in particular. 
 
Second, we highlight the role that corporate reporting plays in supporting public policy as a 
possible source of influence that has contributed to the continued development of PFI. The 
research demonstrates how the portrayal of public policy in annual report narratives can be 
used by the private sector to highlight positive aspects of PFI when society demands 
maintenance of legitimacy that, in turn, benefits PFI private-sector companies. By promoting 
a positive public policy image, the PFI private-sector companies created an institutional support 
mechanism for PFI in the UK. Our analysis supports observations by Ruane (2010) and Toms 
et al. (2011) that successful corporations (such as PFI private-sector companies) will seek out 
strategies to maintain or expand profitable areas of business. Future research could examine 
whether the use of impression management strategies has contributed, at least in part, to the 
endurance of PFI in the UK. 
 
The PFI private-sector companies did not end their PFI activities following criticism of the PFI 
public policy; rather they continued to support its development. Our analysis of PFI company 
annual reports has emphasised the importance of corporate reporting in legitimacy 
management. We support Suchman’s (1995) view that organisations favour the flexibility of 
symbolic management rather than substantive action. The PFI private-sector companies 
intensified their impression management strategies in Period 2. This may reflect the difficulty 
of PFI private-sector companies maintaining legitimacy in non-routine circumstances where a 
public policy image faces intense legitimation challenges. By 2007, PFI was an established 
procurement method and high on the political agenda (i.e. subject to attention from Parliament 
and in National Audit Office reports). PFI private-sector companies faced greater difficulties 
in maintaining legitimacy as, by that time, the policy was widely criticised and arguably better 
understood. Accordingly, we argue that low visibility on a public-policy agenda may be 
advantageous when seeking to maintain legitimacy for a public policy subject to criticism. 
 
Our analysis provides a contribution to practice as it reminds the private sector that even with 
Government-supported policies, steady demand is not guaranteed. During periods of crisis and 
change, established benchmarks of a public policy may erode, requiring a response to ensure 
no loss of legitimacy. In the period following the credit crisis, considerable loss of legitimacy 
occurred, where PFI faced significant uncertainty regarding its future. 
 
We base our findings on a single, albeit nationally important, public policy and on insights 
obtained from three PFI private-sector companies. This makes it difficult to generalise the 
results to other institutional or cultural contexts. We recognise that annual report narratives are 
a complex mix of forces, the complexity of which cannot be fully addressed in this paper. We 
acknowledge that we have focused our attention on a limited number of impression 
management strategies. In addition, we acknowledge the subjectivity of manual content 
analysis. Nevertheless, we believe providing insights into possible sources of influence on 
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Government policies, and on how such influence is exerted, is valuable. Future research could 
examine this further; in particular, the conditions under which legitimation through impression 
management is successful. An ethnographic approach could be adopted, such as Craig and 
Amernic’s (2004, 2006, 2008) trilogy of papers on the relationship between accounting 
reports/narrative and the privatisation of Canadian National Railways. Further, future research 
could consider audience responsiveness for the legitimation attempts. Are the private-sector 
companies successful in trying to persuade their audiences?  
 
In conclusion, the continued criticism of PFI in the UK has created a legitimacy incentive for 
private-sector companies to support PFI. This incentive has arisen due to their self-interest in 
the public policy continuing and generating associated revenue streams. We argue this 
incentive has played out in the annual report narratives by portraying PFI in a positive light 
using impression management strategies to manage pragmatic and moral legitimacy. The 
annual report narratives reveal the strategic importance attributed to PFIs by private sector 
managers and the perceived need to publicly promote them.  
 
Notes 
[1] Data obtained from www.partnershipsuk.org.uk, accessed 6 March 2012. Partnerships UK 
closed in 2011 but its website and database remained available until 2014. The full list of 
projects is available from the authors. 
[2] We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this approach to constructing the issues for 
research. 
[3] These lobbying organisations include, for example, CBI Public Services Strategy Board, 
the PPP Forum and the Business Services Organisation. 
[4] A copy of the coding instructions, including illustrative examples for each coding category 
as a guide to how we made coding decisions, is available from the authors on request. 
[5] We also performed the scaling on a company-by-company basis, with similar results to the 
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 Carillion Interserve Laing 
Total turnover, PFI turnover (PFI proportion of total) 
1997 £2,773.1m Not disclosed £523.6m Not disclosed £1,461,4m Not disclosed 
1998 £3,160.3m Not disclosed £641.1m Not disclosed £1,606.6m Not disclosed 
1999 £1,802.3m £95.1m (5.3%) £769.2m Not disclosed £1,791.7m Not disclosed 
2007 £3,330.7m 1£154.1m (4.6%) £1,738.0m 2£0 £197.6m  3Not disclosed 
2008 £4,433.8m 1£178.4m (4.0%) £1,800.0m 2£0 £243.9m 3Not disclosed 
2009 £4,504.2m 1£215.6m (4.8%) £1,906.8m 2£0 £347.9m 3Not disclosed 
2010 £4,236.5m 1£311.9m (7.4%) £1,872.0m 2£0 £343.3m 3Not disclosed 
Total profit before tax, PFI profit before tax (PFI proportion of total)  
1997 £115.2m Not disclosed £22.3m  Not disclosed £32.2m Not disclosed 
1998 £131.4m 1,4 £4.8m (13.0%) £23.6m Not disclosed £20.1m Not disclosed 
1999 £35.1m 1,4 £5.0m (12.1%) £29.2m Not disclosed £52.7m Not disclosed 
2007 £94.4m 1,4 £25.4m 
(21.1%) 
£69.3m 2 £2.1m (4.3%) £34.5m 3Not disclosed 
2008 £115.9m 1,4 £29.8m 
(15.4%) 
£79.9m 2 £2.8m (4.9%) £43.6m  3Not disclosed 
2009 £147.7m 1,4 £32.3m 
(14.9%) 
£89.2m 2 £4.7m (6.5%) £18.3m  3Not disclosed 
2010 £167.9m 1,4 £23.4m 
(11.0%) 
£64.1m 2 £4.2m (7.9%) £68.0m 3Not disclosed 
Return on equity 
1997 as Tarmac 8.5%  as Tilbury Douglas 19.5%  12.2%  
1998 as Tarmac 8.7%   as Tilbury Douglas 15.8%   7.1%  
1999 as Carillion 19.0%   as Tilbury Douglas 13.3%   17.2%  
2007 15.6%  27.0%  5.8%  
2008 12.8%  24.8%  19.1%  
2009 17.5%  32.7%  5.1%  
2010 17.7%  20.8%  26.8%  
1 Figures relate to the PPP segment. However, other segments including Support Services and 
Construction Services include activities relating to PPP projects as well. The proportion of PPP projects in 
Support Services and Construction Services is not stated. 
2 Figures relate to the PFI Investments segment. This segment coordinates Interserve’s identification of 
suitable projects, selection of bid partners, bid management process and management of PFI equity 
investments. This segment does not generate revenue but does contribute to profit. Interserve’s main PFI 
activities are included within the Facilities Management, Project Services and Equipment Services 
segments. The proportion of PFI projects in these segments is not stated. 
3 In Period 2, John Laing identified PFI as ‘the principal activity of the Company’ (Laing, 2007, p. 67). 
However, what proportion of Turnover and Profit relates to PFI is not stated, although it is likely a 
significant proportion. 
















Assertive statements Description Defensive statements Description 
1. Awards / 
Recognition 
Statements indicating external recognition and 
commendation of positive efforts pertinent to PFI 
1. Development – 
Negative 
Statements about the negative 
development of PFI policy 
generally 
2. Development – 
Positive 
Statements of fact about the positive development 
of PFI policy generally 
2. Challenges – 
Internal  
Statements about specific internal 
challenges facing the PFI company 
3. Progress Statements of fact about the progress of PFI or 
PFI projects within a specific company 
3. Challenges – 
External 
Statements about specific external 
challenges facing PFI policy 
4. Internal 
Activities 
Statements about specific internal actions 
pertinent to the positive development of PFI, 
including the award, financial close, construction, 
completion and operation of projects 
4. PFI 
Characteristics  
Statements concerning specific PFI 
characteristics criticised, including 
risk, benchmarking, refinancing and 
value for money 
5. Expertise / 
Leadership 
Statements relating to the expertise or leadership 
of individual PFI companies 
5. PFI 
Alternatives 
Statements concerning alternative 
financing approaches to PFI 
6. Investment 
Activities 
Statements concerning investment in or sale of 
equity in the PFI market 
   
7. Opportunity Articulation of achievement of opportunities in 
PFI now or in the future 




8. Partnership Statements concerning partnership as a 
characteristic of PFI 





























Company, annual  
 
No. of statements No. of words 
report year Period 1 Period 2 Total Period 1 Period 2 Total 
Carillion, 1997 26  26 486  486 
Carillion, 1998 29  29 471  471 
Carillion, 1999 52  52 1,103  1,103 
Carillion, 2007  86 86  1,929 1,929 
Carillion, 2008  88 88  1,815 1,815 
Carillion, 2009  145 145  2,967 2,967 
Carillion, 2010  144 144  3,014 3,014 
Interserve, 1997 10  10 174  174 
Interserve, 1998 17  17 308  308 
Interserve, 1999 16  16 321  321 
Interserve, 2007  44 44  680 680 
Interserve, 2008  80 80  1,815 1,815 
Interserve, 2009  60 60  1,198 1,198 
Interserve, 2010  29 29  637 637 
Laing, 1997 46  46 881  881 
Laing, 1998 54  54 929  929 
Laing, 1999 19  19 329  329 
Laing, 2007  174 174  3,355 3,355 
Laing, 2008  165 165  2,848 2,848 
Laing, 2009  181 181  3,680 3,680 
Laing, 2010  207 207  3,680 3,680 




Average number of words per statement 18.6 19.7  
 28 
 PFI-related annual report narratives as a % of total annual 
report narratives (in words) 
 Carillion Interserve Laing Overall 
 No. words (%) No. words (%) No. words (%) No. words (%) 
Period 1 2,060 (16%) 803 (  7%) 2,139 (10%) 5,002 (11%) 
Period 2 9,725 (23%) 4,330 (14%) 13,563 (24%) 27,618 (21%) 
Mann-Whitney U Z statistic -2.121 -2.121 -2.141 -3.413 
Two-tailed probability 0.34* 0.34* 0.32* 0.001** 
  Table IV. 
PFI narratives 
Period 1 and 
Period 2 (RQ1) 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of PFI-related annual report narratives as 
a % of total annual narratives between period 1 & 2 (RQ1a).  
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at < 0.05 
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Assertive statements (RQ2a)       
1. Awards/Recognition 22 106 128 
2. Development – Positive 5 85 90 
3. Progress 36 128 164 
4. Internal Activities 75 305 380 
5. Expertise/Leadership 33 112 145 
6. Investment Activities 19 154 173 
7. Opportunity 27 154 181 
8. Partnership    6     19      25 
  223 1,063 1,286 
 
Defensive statements (RQ2a)       
1. Development – Negative 0 21 21 
2. Challenges – Internal  3 16 19 
3. Challenges – External  1 19 20 
4. PFI Characteristics 2 14 16 
5. PFI Alternatives 0 26   26 
  6 96 102 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings between assertive and 
defensive statements (RQ2a): Z statistic -3.134; Two-tailed probability 0.002** 
 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of assertive statements 
between period 1 & 2 (RQ2b): Z statistic -2.121; Two-tailed probability 0.034* 
 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of defensive statements 
between period 1 & 2 (RQ2b): Z statistic -2.141; Two-tailed probability 0.032* 
 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at < 0.05 
 
    
Neutral statements       
1. Descriptive statements 39 232 271 
2. Development – Neutral   1   12   13 




Total statements 269 1,403 1,672 
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 No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Rhetorical association / disassociation strategies (RQ3) 
Personal pronouns       
1st person pronouns 103 (85.8%) 556 (88.3%) 659 (87.9%) 
3rd person pronouns   17  (14.2%)   74  (11.7%)   91  (12.1%) 
  120 (100.0%) 630 (100.0%) 750 (100.0%) 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of first person pronouns 
between period 1 & 2 (RQ3a): Z statistic -2.701; Two-tailed probability 0.007** 
 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of third person pronouns 
between period 1 & 2 (RQ3a): Z statistic -1.967; Two-tailed probability 0.49 
Active/passive voice       
Active voice 214 (79.6%) 1,169 (83.3%) 1,383 (82.7%) 
Passive voice   55  (20.4%)    234  (16.7%)    289  (17.3%) 
  269 (100.0%) 1,403 (100.0%) 1,672 (100.0%) 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of active voice between 
period 1 & 2 (RQ3a): Z statistic -3.199; Two-tailed probability 0.001** 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of passive voice between 
period 1 & 2 (RQ3a): Z statistic -2.465; Two-tailed probability 0.014* 
Naming strategy       
PFI 110 (96.5%) 240 (42.3%) 350 (51.3%) 
PPP     4  (  3.5%) 328  (57.7%) 332  (48.7%) 






Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of PFI naming strategy 
between period 1 & 2 (RQ3a): Z statistic 0.782; Two-tailed probability 0.434 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of PPP naming strategy 
between period 1 & 2 (RQ3a): Z statistic -2.925; Two-tailed probability 0.003** 
 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at < 0.05 
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 No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
PFI- versus self-promotion       
PFI-policy promotion 114 (81.4%) 568 (78.3%) 682 (78.8%) 
PFI company self-promotion   26  (18.6%) 157  (21.7%) 183  (21.2%) 
  140 (100.0%) 725 (100.0%) 865 (100.0%) 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of PFI-policy promotion 
and self-promotion (RQ4a): Z statistic -3.504; Two-tailed probability 0.000** 
 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in PFI- policy promotion between period 1 & 
2 (RQ4b): Z statistic -2.489; Two-tailed probability 0.013* 
 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in PFI private-sector company self-promotion 
between period 1 & 2 (RQ4b): Z statistic -2.544; Two-tailed probability 0.011* 















(all Period 2) 
Internal attribution    
Skills of PFI company 10 0 10 
 10 0 10 
External attribution    
Politics – Government support 7 2 9 
Politics – Government reviews/ regulations 11 7 18 
Politics – Elections  1 5 6 
Economy – credit crisis 0 13 13 
 19 27 46 Table VIII.
Attribution: Internal 
/ external causal 
explanations (RQ5)















Period 1    
Carillion 114 101 13 (11%) 
Interserve 154 152 2 (1%) 
Laing 103 101 2 (2%) 
Overall 371 354 17 (5%) 
    
Period 2    
Carillion 253 215 38 (15%) 
Interserve 89 86 3 (  3%) 
Laing 61 55 6 (10%) 
Overall 403 356 47 (12%) 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of Non-PFI and 
PFI profit/return disclosures (RQ6): Z statistic -7.717; Two-tailed 
probability 0.000** 
 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in profit/return disclosures 
between period 1 & 2 (RQ6a): Z statistic -1.504; Two-tailed 
probability 0.132 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at < 0.05 Table IX.
PFI-selectivity
(RQ6)
 
